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DETROIT CEASEFIRE
INDIVIDUAL RE-OFFENDING ANALYSES
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT

MICHIGAN STATE
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Michigan Justice Statistics Center

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Summary: In the evaluation report of Detroit Ceasefire[1], the research team summarized the key finding that Ceasefire was associated with reductions in fatal and non-fatal shootings in the precincts where it had been implemented. The analysis of the impact on individuals participating in Ceasefire was promising in terms of the number of repeat incidents but the overall differences in re-arrest between Ceasefire clients and similar probationers and parolees were limited. The challenge in that analysis, however, was that Ceasefire clients are purposively selected based on their involvement in gangs and violent street groups and consequently they represent a high risk group of probationers and parolees.

In an effort to address this limitation, the research team worked with the Detroit Police Department's (DPD) Gang Intelligence Unit to develop a more comparable comparison group. Specifically, the probationer and parolee comparison group that was previously matched based on characteristics including gender, race, and number of prior arrests, was also matched based on gang affiliation. This produced a comparison group more equivalent to the Ceasefire clients than in the original analysis.

The research team then conducted an analysis of re-offending comparing participants in Ceasefire with probationers and parolees with similar demographic, prior offense, and gang affiliation characteristics.

Findings:

This analysis focused on individuals participating in Detroit Ceasefire call-in meetings between August 2013 and December 2016. The advantage of focusing on these clients is that it allows a three-year follow-up period. There were 14 call-in meetings during this period involving 257 clients who attended a meeting. As Table 1 indicates, the clients averaged between five and six prior arrests. The comparison group consisted of 337 probationers and parolees with very similar demographic and arrest histories. Additionally, these were probationers and parolees with gang affiliations.

Table 2 reports on the number of initial re-arrests. That is, the number of individuals with a re-arrest at one year, two years, and three years. After three years, 59 percent of the comparison group had a re-arrest for any offense compared to 51 percent for Ceasefire clients. Similarly, after three years, 18 percent of the comparison group had been re-arrested for a violent offense compared to 15 percent of Ceasefire clients. For weapons offense arrests, 12 percent of the comparison group had been re-arrested compared to 9 percent of Ceasefire clients. As displayed in Figure 1, an interesting pattern emerges whereby Ceasefire clients initially had more arrests for weapons offenses but this declined significantly over the full three-year period. This likely reflects Ceasefire "pulling levers" enforcement action. Following a call-in, if there was continued violence involving gangs and groups warned at a call-in meeting, there would be proactive Ceasefire enforcement. This included Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)-DPD compliance home visits, warrant service, directed patrols and similar activities. It seems likely this resulted in greater likelihood of arrest for Ceasefire clients in the period following a

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[1] Circo, McGarrell, Krupa & De Biasi, *Detroit Ceasefire: Final Evaluation Report.* East Lansing, MI: Michigan Justice Statistics Center, School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University. https://cj.msu.edu/assets/MJSC-Detroit_Ceasefire_-Final_Report.pdf

call-in meeting. The finding that Ceasefire clients had fewer re-arrests over the three-year period is encouraging given the pulling levers component of the Ceasefire strategy.

The overall findings are further reflected in Table 3. This table presents the results of what is known as a survival analysis. This is considered the state-of-the-art analytical technique of re-offending because it captures the time until failure (re-arrest) and the time of survival (no re-arrest). It also allows the researchers to control for factors known to relate to re-arrest, in this case the prior criminal history of the Ceasefire client or comparison probationer and parolee. The results of this analysis indicate that Ceasefire clients had a significant reduction in failure for any arrest and for a violent crime arrest. Indeed, Ceasefire clients had a 29 percent reduction in time to failure for any arrest and a 47 percent reduction in time to failure for a violent crime. There was not a statistically significant decline in time to failure for weapons offense arrests but this likely reflects proactive enforcement (e.g., MDOC-DPD home compliance checks) in the period following the call-in meeting.

In sum, these results suggest that along with reducing community levels of violence, Detroit Ceasefire has produced positive findings in terms of re-offending among Ceasefire clients.

Table 1: Ceasefire Clients, August 2013 through December 2016

| | | | | Client Prior Arrest History (Mean) | | | | |
Call-in Meeting	# Attended	Age	All Arrests	Violent	Property	Disorder	Drugs	Weapon
8/29/2013	16	23.88	5.25	1.31	1.19	1.31	0.69	0.38
12/12/2013	13	23.54	5.69	0.92	0.77	1.69	0.69	0.54
5/20/2014	9	24.67	4.44	0.44	1.67	1.00	1.11	0.11
8/28/2014	15	24.53	5.60	0.80	1.00	1.80	0.67	0.53
12/4/2014	14	26.07	4.71	0.64	1.14	1.00	0.43	0.71
3/25/2015	17	24.18	5.94	1.12	1.06	1.53	0.94	0.41
8/27/2015	16	25.31	5.63	0.75	0.88	1.50	0.88	0.44
11/14/2015	24	23.54	6.33	1.00	1.38	1.46	1.21	0.42
1/26/2016	19	25.26	6.84	0.74	1.26	2.32	1.21	0.42
5/18/2016	24	25.00	5.04	0.75	1.13	1.04	0.88	0.58
6/16/2016	22	24.64	6.50	0.59	1.27	1.32	1.23	0.41
8/25/2016	20	24.35	5.45	0.85	1.00	1.25	0.90	0.50
9/29/2016	22	24.50	5.77	1.45	0.82	1.45	0.77	0.45
12/1/2016	26	25.42	5.54	0.46	1.15	0.96	1.42	0.50

Table 2: Initial Re-arrest, Ceasefire Clients and Comparison Group

First Arrest, Post-Call in, by Arrest Category

| | | Ceasefire Clients (N=257) | | Comparison Group (N=337) | |
| Groups | | | | | |
Crime	Time from Call in	Cumulative Number Arrested	Percent	Cumulative Number Arrested	Percent
	1 Year	88	35%	115	34%
Any Arrest	2 Years	122	48%	167	50%
	3 Years	130	51%	200	59%
	1 Year	21	8%	20	6%
Violent Arrest	2 Years	33	13%	47	14%
	3 Years	37	15%	61	18%
	1 Year	16	6%	15	4%
Weapons Arrest	2 Years	23	9%	28	8%
	3 Years	24	9%	41	12%

Figure 1: Initial Re-Arrest, Ceasefire Clients and Comparison Group

Percent Arrested, by Year and Arrest Category

Table 3: Cox Proportional Hazards Regression on Time to Re-Arrest, 3-Year Estimates

Variables	Model Outcomes		
	All Arrests	Violent Arrest	Weapon Arrest
Ceasefire Call-in	-0.331**	-0.636**	-0.182
	(0.129)	(0.248)	(0.318)
(log) Age	-1.558***	-1.88**	-3.477***
	(0.366)	(0.659)	(0.971)
<u>Prior Arrest History</u>			
Violent	-0.034	0.067	0.044
	(0.085)	(0.146)	(0.197)
Property	0.172**	0.36***	-0.272
	(0.05)	(0.079)	(0.164)
Disorder	0.143*	0.088	0.182
	(0.062)	(0.103)	(0.156)
Drugs	0.131	0.16	-0.085
	(0.079)	(0.136)	(0.229)
Weapon	0.167	0.044	0.284
	(0.109)	(0.21)	(0.255)

* p <.05; ** p < .01; *** p <.001

Figure 2. Covariate-Adjusted Survival Curves: Time (in Days) to Re-Arrest